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Government failed to use 
all reform opportunities 
The government of Ukraine failed to benefit
from the favourable conditions in 2003—
the economic upturn, advantageous foreign
economic situation, and rapprochement
with the EU, USA, and international
organisations—and undertake profound
reforms of the economy’s public sector.
Following a flurry of tax and pension
reforms in H1’03, transformations took a
slower pace: 
• The system of insurance payments to
social funds, which is one of the
important factors driving the economy
into the shadow, has remained unaltered; 
• No viable mechanism to resolve the
problem of VAT non-reimbursement to
exporters has been developed so far; 
• Tax benefits have not undergone any
sizeable cuts; 
• Protection of corporate and property
rights has not been legislatively secured; 
• The switch from benefits to targeted
monetary assistance, as well as reforms in
the housing and public utility sector,
energy sector, and other monopoly
entities, have never been initiated. 
With the lack of new progress in reforming
the economy, the government has even
started to back down from what had already
been achieved. Specifically, the 2004 budget
does not envisage several important
measures for reforming the pension system
that were set forth in the new law on
pension insurance. In addition, the 2003
state policy often led to tighter government
pressure, which stymied private initiative.
Notably, the Ukrzaliznytsia state railway
corporation and the State Customs Service
worked actively against the export of oil
products, attempting to curb the price rises
that negatively affected the government,
and the Cabinet of Ministers obstructed
exports of coke coal and scrap metal. 
In addition, the government and local
administrations took the whole year to
decide how to fix bread prices (and for what
types) rather than pay more heed to
conditions at the State Committee for
Material Reserves or sign advance
procurement contracts for grain imports to
Ukraine. 
In the meantime, continuing favourable
external conditions, a stable financial
situation, and the government’s focus on
privatising large-sized enterprises, as well as
completion of commenced reforms give
reason to hope for persisting high economic
growth. In our opinion, the main problem in
the work of the current coalition
government is the lack of a coordinated
reform plan, which reflects the divergence of
economic views of government officials in
charge of different sectors of the economy. 
Economic dynamic assumed 
a brisker pace in 2003 
The economic growth rate, which had
dropped mid-year to 6% due to the sharp
downturn in agriculture, accelerated
towards the end of the year, and over
January–November 2003 amounted to 7.7%
in real terms. Growth factors, as previously,
include the expansion of foreign trade and
increased purchasing power domestically.
Construction will continue to grow the most
rapidly (25% is the annual estimate), which
is connected to the investment activity of
enterprises. The growth rate in industry
accelerated to 15.5%, chiefly owing to
growth in the food industry, machine
building, the chemical industry, and
metallurgy. We estimate that by the 
2003 year-end results, GDP will grow by 8%. 
Ukraine’s foreign trade volumes increased
sizeably. This was brought about not only
by a rise in the exports of raw materials and
semi-finished products, but by the high
growth of machinery and equipment exports
as well (according to our estimate, the 
2003 growth rate will be 35%), particularly
of vehicles (55%). Imports, in turn, grew
not only owing to the high need for energy
in thriving industry, but also due to larger
exports of goods of investment demand. 
The NBU reported that over the first nine
months of 2003, merchandise exports picked
by 26% y-o-y, while merchandise imports
increased by 30%. Foreign trade in services
also followed an upward trend, although at a
slacker pace. Over January–September 2003,
service exports increased by almost 13%,
while imports thereof remained virtually
unchanged. We predict that this trend will
generally persist till the year end. 
Lively exports fostered an even greater
openness of the Ukrainian economy, with
the export/GDP ratio reaching 60%.
Therefore, the national economy is getting
increasingly vulnerable to the external
market situation. This entails two trends:
(1) heightened risk of a fading economic
dynamic if the situation in major export
markets deteriorates; and (2) stimulated
development of the domestic market. 
On the demand side, accelerated investment
was the most important factor in speeding
up the economic growth from 4.8% last year
to 8% this year. Our expectation is that the
2003 results will show a record-high growth
of 20%. We believe that the key factors
behind the increased investments are
improved current financial status of
enterprises and optimistic expectations for
economic development in the years to
come. Traditionally, enterprises’ own money
has been the main source of investment;
that is why the increased corporate profits
observed this year have dramatically
expanded the investment opportunities of
economic entities. However, a sectoral
analysis of investments shows irregular and
unstable investment activity. Investment in
fixed assets are forging ahead in transport
and communications, light industry,
metallurgy, and machine building, while the
chemical and pulp&paper sectors have even
suffered cuts in investment. Such a dynamic
Reforms have stalled despite the accelerated economic growth in Ukraine this
year. The government failed to take advantage of the favourable conditions in
2003 to drastically reform the public sector. The initiation of tax and pension
reforms in early 2003 did not last into H2’03. We predict that in 2004, reforms
will not accelerate either, because the government’s resources and efforts will
be diverted to the election campaign. In 2005, the new government will
activate economic reforms, but the positive effect of these reforms will show a
bit later. The environment will remain conducive to reforms in 2004–2005;
economic growth will persist, though it will decline from 8% to 6%
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signals that stable production capacity
renewal trends remain out of reach and do
not cover the entire economy. 
In 2003, consumer demand grew by 10%;
we consider the following to be key factors
behind it: (1) increased personal incomes;
(2) better economic expectations than last
year; and (3) a more active usage of
savings accumulated in previous years. 
Macrofinancial stability
persists, despite escalating
inflation 
The persisting financial stability has also
been a reason for a strong economic
dynamic. A high current account balance of
payments (over 3 billion USD annually) has
stimulated hard currency inflows to the
country, thus stabilising the hryvnia
exchange rate, which the National Bank
virtually tied to the US dollar at 
5.33 UAH/USD. In the meantime, in the
light of the worldwide trend to a weakening
dollar, as well as an escalated inflation rate
in Ukraine’s major trading partner—
Russia—a perceptible hryvnia depreciation
is taking place in real terms, which first of
all is contributing to price competitiveness
of Ukrainian exports. 
Price and exchange rate stability has been
facilitated by 100% replenishment of
budget revenues, which enabled to fully
finance the Consolidated Budget
expenditures. However, for most of the year
the government refrained from doing so,
apparently considering it more expedient to
accumulate funds to offset peak external
payouts, and to raise minimum wages and
pensions at the year-end. Again, state
capital investments suffered from
incomplete financing. This automatically
diminishes the role of the public sector in
the economy under the circumstances when
private investments are advancing far more
speedily. Underfinancing applies above all
to local budgets; meanwhile, the execution
level of expenditures of the general fund of
the State Budget is almost 100% of the
plan. 
Over the year, the budget surplus has hit
2% of GDP and become one of the causes of
a liquidity crisis in the inter-bank market,
whose peak came in mid-November.
Improved administration of budget
revenues and higher industry and import
growth rates compared to GDP pushed the
share of GDP re-distribution via the budget
up to 28%. A better execution of the
revenues part compared to that of
expenditures has to do with the
accumulation of large sums of money on
the State Treasury’s account. We expect
that the 2003 Consolidated Budget will be
executed with a 0.2% GDP surplus. 
For the most of the year, the inflationary
dynamic was calm, as well. However, in
autumn prices did begin to surge; we
explain this burst of inflation largely by an
increased production cost of flour, bread,
and meat, due to the higher prices for
imported grain, as well as partial price
liberalisation for flour and baked goods
during October–November 2003. Since the
beginning of the year, prices on flour and
baked goods have skyrocketed by 72% and
27%, respectively. In addition, price rises
were also triggered by the overheating
economy. According to preliminary
estimates, consumer prices will have
increased by 8.5% at YE’03. 
In a bid to curb inflation and the demand
for currency, the National Bank resorted
to a tighter monetary policy. This led to a
leveling-out of the demand-supply
equilibrium in the inter-bank forex
market, as well as dampened the lending
rate. According to our estimate, in 2003
the growth rate of the banks’ deposit base
and of their credit portfolio will roughly
equal 60%. 
Challenges in 2004 
We are pessimistic about the prospects for
continuing reforms. According to our
assumptions, the pro-government coalition
will retain its power over the parliament
and executive government till October
2004, with the composition of the
coalition and the government majority
remaining unchanged, though certain
ministers are likely to be reshuffled. 
The quality and results of the state policy
pursued by the current coalition still will
not be high enough, and most reforms will
be tabled at least until the election,
because the government fails to
understand their importance and also
because of pressure from influential
business groups. Such reforms may be
initiated by the new president already in
2005, though their tempo and quality will
depend on the personality of the new head
of state. 
We predict that government activity in
2004 will be aimed at stimulating final
consumption and finalising the reforms
already launched, rather than at
investments and new unpopular reforms.
This will help to retain the rather high
GDP growth rate; however, it will no
longer be supported by such a strong
foreign economic situation as this year.
Therefore, ICPS leaves unaltered its
forecast for real GDP growth in 2004, 
at 6.5%. 
A slower growth rate of real personal
incomes at the end of 2003 will bring about
a negligible decrease in consumption next
year from 10% to 9%; at the same time,
investment growth will stall perceptibly,
sinking from 20% to 8%, which we attribute
to the following: (1) the factor of the
presidential election; (2) slowed export
growth; and (3) decelerated bank lending
to the economy ensuing from the
accelerated inflation at this year-end and a
tighter monetary policy. 
In light of the presidential election, the
government will stimulate final
consumption and even increase budget
expenditures up to 28.5% of GDP, in order
to fully honour its social obligations. 
Cuts in the corporate profit and personal
income tax rates will drive down budget
revenues, from this year’s 28% to 27% of
GDP next year. However, the government
will be able to finance the 1.5% deficit of
GDP at the expense of foreign borrowings
and privatisation. We expect the increased
budget deficit to reanimate the market of
domestic public borrowing. 
We believe that the 2004 budget is an
unsuccessful attempt at a compromise
between long- and short-term government
objectives, namely, reforms undertaken and
increased social outlays prior to the
presidential election. On the one hand, the
document envisages a raise in the minimum
wage and increased spending on subsidies
and assistance. On the other, it still offers
no solution to the problem of the quality of
budget expenditures. 
The focus on macrofinancial stability will
persist. The price growth rate, in the light
of a better harvest expected in 2004, will
diminish to 6% y-o-y. The National Bank
will continue to buoy a stable UAH/USD
exchange rate. Sizeable foreign debt
repayments and the risk of escalated
inflation will impede the liberalisation of
the financial sector, which is one of the key
requirements of the World Trade
Organisation. Our opinion is that the
National Bank will only abolish sectoral
restrictions right before the accession to
the WTO in 2005. 
In 2004, the major challenge of Ukraine’s
foreign economic policy will be the
European Union’s enlargement. This time,
another ten countries will adopt the EU’s
common foreign economic policy, which
will dramatically affect Ukrainian exports to
these countries. In 2004–2005, Ukraine will
also be missing out due to non-tariff
restrictions, which will do away with the
positive effect from the liberalisation of
custom tariffs. According to our estimates,
Ukraine’s exports to candidate countries in
2004–2005 will shrink by 320–340 million
USD annually.
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